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1962/11/03

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INCOMING TELEGRAM

Department of State

54-W

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AFControl: 1151
Rec'd: November 3, 1962

Info FROM: Conakry

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TO: Secretary of State DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MER

NO: 232, November 3, 3 p.m., RELEASE DECLASSIFY DATE 11/18/62REVIEWED by M. H. Kelly

() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART

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FOIA Exemptions (b) (1)

TS authority to:

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ACTION DEPARTMENT 232, INFORMATION LINE 1151 () S () C OADR

References: (A) DEPTEL 331, (B) Circular 807

RMR Called on Sekou Toure today. Gave him President's personal message. He seemed to appreciate it but made no comment.

I then said Cuban accord and perhaps wider settlement with Soviet being held up by Castro intransigence about UN observers. Since so much at stake we hoped he and others who non-aligned and acquainted with Castro might persuade him cooperate in interest of peace.

Toure said he had already received messages from Nehru, Nasser, Tito and Sukarno with view assuming united position on both Cuba and India crises. GOG political bureau meeting today to discuss these questions.

Toure then said that speaking unofficially but as a friend he personally felt Guinea should support US one hundred per cent on question Russian bases. This was in line their opposition foreign bases on neutral territory. For same reason he agreed with Castro on Guantanamo.

To my remark that Castro no longer neutral he replied: "that is true. He is now aligned. But when I saw him in 1960, he was a genuine neutralist. For example, it was he who proposed the Belgrade Conference to me and I then discussed it with Tito,

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MR. GENE CLOUTIER

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-2- 232, November 3, 3 p.m. from Conakry

Nasser and Nehru. Later the Russians put very heavy pressure on Castro not to attend but he went anyway."

Toure continued: "the trouble with Castro is that he did not have the ideological experience or intellectual equipment to resist those in Cuba who wished to align him with the Soviets. I did. When the same elements in our trade union movement and elsewhere tried to push Guinea into the Soviet camp, I knew what they were up to and how to handle them. Castro is too emotional and too naive. But he is still sincere and I think if you Americans handle him intelligently he is not lost."

Toure continued: "what you must remember is to keep this problem in a Soviet - American context. Then Guinea, and I believe all the non-aligned countries, will support you. But if you turn it into a Cuban - American problem in which you seem to be opposing the Cuban revolution, then we will oppose you. Perhaps we can be of some help in restoring Castro to non-alignment but only if you are reasonable after Russians have removed their bases."

I reminded him of the President's assurance that our number one concern were the offensive Soviet weapons near our shores. This seemed to please him. He also agreed that the presence of UN observers in Cuba should add to Castro's sense of security if he seriously feared an invasion.

Toure said he would be glad to talk with Ambassador Bowles during his Conakry visit next week. This should provide additional opportunity to discuss both Cuba and India problems and ascertain or perhaps influence GOG position.

ATTWOOD

LTR/14

Note: Mr. King (AF) notified, advance copy SS, 9 PM, 11/3,
CWO-JSW.

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